Key takeaways
SIM swap and “Mão Fantasma” are now the main vectors of mobile fraud in Brazil; carriers, as the first link in the chain, face losses, regulatory penalties, and eroding customer trust if they don’t protect the number and other critical flows.
Traditional verification fails due to reliance on exposed static data, SMS OTPs over compromised channels, and vulnerable human processes; number portability and SIM replacement/duplication are the most critical points and require strong identity, line-level signals, alternate-channel confirmation, and cooling-off periods.
Anatel requires SMS confirmation for number portability (with a response window); the updated RGST and RGC reinforce transparency and traceability. SMS is mandatory but insufficient as strong authentication in high-risk scenarios.
Effective strategy and Didit’s role: real-time KYC (ID document, selfie, and liveness), biometrics and MFA in high-impact flows, and decisions informed by line signals. An automated, flexible platform reduces reliance on manual review, improves detection, and enables easy integration with transparent pricing.
Brazil is experiencing a surge in digital crime where the mobile line is the critical weak link: SIM swap lets attackers take over a number and intercept OTPs (one-time passwords) sent by SMS to access bank accounts and other sensitive financial apps. The result? BRL 10.1 billion in bank losses in 2024, according to FEBRABAN (Federação Brasileira de Bancos).
But financial organizations aren’t the only ones affected. Telecom operators—often the first link in the chain—also face direct losses, regulatory penalties, and eroding customer trust due to identity fraud.
One thing is clear: the fraudsters’ playbook. Using social engineering, they exploit weak carrier processes and verify themselves with leaked (or stolen) data from the dark web. And it’s not the only threat on the radar: Mão Fantasma has become another major scam. Criminals trick victims into installing a remote-access app; from there, they take control of the phone without the person noticing and guide fraudulent banking transactions. Banks and FEBRABAN advise against installing apps at someone’s phone request or granting remote access to third parties.
SIM swap is one of the biggest threats to the sector in Brazil. In this type of fraud, a criminal convinces the carrier to issue a new SIM tied to the victim’s number, blending social engineering with leaked data from the dark web.
Once they control the number, the attacker captures SMS OTPs meant for the legitimate customer (for logins or account recovery), leading to what’s known as account takeover.
SIM swap is a growing problem, with meaningful success rates reported across the industry, keeping it a top priority for fraud and security teams.
Brazil faces one of the world’s most aggressive cybercrime environments. Every two seconds there’s an identity-fraud attempt and, in many cases, companies can’t detect, fight, and stop it in time.
While there are no official figures for the exact number of SIM-swap incidents, estimates suggest tens of thousands of users may be affected each year.
The spotlight needs to be on the weakness of current tools and processes. Widely used solutions in Brazil have proved insufficient due to their reliance on static checks, manual reviews, and rigid processes. And it’s not just the tools—approaches fall short, too.
Mass data exposure on the dark web means that with static data (like CPF or date of birth), an attacker can bypass very basic initial checks. When that data is already public, “what you know” verification no longer proves identity.
Plus, many telco workflows still lean heavily on human validation (in store or via call center) and lack real-time risk-signal analysis.
The result is an ecosystem where:
Number portability between carriers and SIM replacement/duplication concentrate the highest operational risk. These are high-impact events: if attackers get through, they take control of the number, and with it, downstream authentications.
To fight back, carriers should adopt high-assurance standards:
Anatel (Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações) requires mobile number portability to be confirmed by SMS to the user’s current line. The account holder has up to 6 hours to reply; if they don’t respond or reply “no,” the request is automatically canceled. These measures don’t replace strong authentication in high-risk scenarios, but they’re a regulatory minimum every telco must meet.
The Agency also approved the Regulamento Geral dos Serviços de Telecomunicações (RGST), consolidating and updating rules for the telecom sector.
Separately, the Regulamento Geral de Direitos do Consumidor was recently updated and consolidated (September 2025), reinforcing obligations for transparency, quality, and reversibility in the user relationship. This affects how portability, SIM replacements, and data changes are communicated and executed, as well as traceability for disputes.
With the right tools and processes, carriers can significantly reduce identity fraud.
Brazil faces exceptional fraud volumes and, for operators, priority number one is reducing losses from SIM swap, fraudulent portability, and sensitive data changes. Didit is an identity-verification platform built with that goal at its core.
What does that mean operationally?
In an environment where traditional providers lean on static validations, manual reviews, and rigid processes, Didit adds an automated, orchestratable layer—connected to government sources—that reduces dependence on manual review, improves detection, and keeps the experience under control. It combines complete identity verification with a global fraud-pattern base to make real-time decisions on new activations, portability, and SIM replacements.